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Abstract
The US Merger Guidelines leave it an open question if the SSNIP test
requires an increase in one, some or all prices in the candidate market. We
argue that the characteristics of the candidate market in question should
be decisive for how to perform the SSNIP test. If there are asymmetries
between products, increasing one price might be a better procedure in
order to identify competitive constraints. Katz & Shapiro (2003) derived
a one-price criterion in terms of the aggregate diversion ratio which is ap-
plicable for asymmetric candidate markets. Unfortunately, the derivation
is incorrect. We derive a corrected criterion.
1 Introduction
The SSNIP test was introduced with the 1982 US Merger Guidelines and is
widely used by competition authorities to delineate relevant markets. The pur-
pose of market delineation is to identify any competitive constraints. Some
economists have argued that market delineation makes little economic sense,
and that one should rather focus directly on the anti-competitive effects.1 We
agree that market delineation is not a goal in itself, but rather an input to the
analysis of any possible anti-competitive effect. If only for legal reasons, market
delineation is and will probably continue to be an important part of antitrust
practice. Given that markets are to be delineated, it should be performed in
the way that makes the most economic sense.
In line with such a reasoning, when choosing the criterion one should antici-
pate how market power might be exploited. For example, would a merger result
in a symmetric increase in prices on all products controlled by the merged firm
or would we expect some asymmetric price increases? If some asymmetries,
then one should consider to use a SSNIP test where prices are increased asym-
metrically. This is an argument for applying the criterion introduced in Katz &
Shapiro (2003). Unfortunately, their criterion is incorrect. In their model they
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1See, for instance, Ivaldi and Lo¨rincz (2005).
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did not take into account the fact that by increasing the price of one product,
some sales is diverted to the other products in the candidate market. We derive
the correct criterion, and it turns out that markets are delineated too broadly
if one uses the criterion derived in Katz & Shapiro (2003).
In the next section we discuss the choice between two different criterions for
performing the SSNIP test. In section 3 we derive the Harris & Simons (1989)
critical loss criterion, while we in section 4 derive the Katz & Shapiro criterion.
Then we explain the error in the Katz & Shapiro (2003) criterion, and derive
the correct criterion in section 5. In section 6 we offer some concluding remarks.
2 Increasing any or all prices?
It is not perfectly clear from the wording of the US Merger Guidelines whether
the SSNIP test requires a relative increase in the price of one, some or all of the
products in the candidate market.2 The ambiguity of the Guidelines has led to
different profitability criterions being used in the literature.3 Harris & Simons
(1989) derived a criterion based on a uniform price increase on all products in
the candidate market. Katz & Shapiro (2003) introduced a somewhat different
test. They considered the effect of raising the price of only one product and
derived a market delineation criterion based on the aggregate diversion ratio.
The basic question that distinguishes the two criterions is whether one in the
SSNIP test should assume that one or all prices increase.4 On p. 54, Katz &
Shapiro (2003) argue
“[...][W]e have followed the letter of the Merger Guidelines in asking
whether the hypothetical monopolist would find it most profitable
to raise the price of at least one product of the merging parties by
some threshold amount above prevailing levels. However, we are
aware that the market definition test often employed in practice is
slightly different. Specifically, the test often takes the form of asking
whether the hypothetical monopolist would find it most profitable
to raise the prices of all of the products in the candidate market at
least 5 percent above prevailing levels” (italics in original)
Although they argue that one should increase only one price, it is no doubt
possible to argue that it is consistent with the Merger Guidelines to increase all
prices, as is done in Harris & Simons (1989). In fact, one cannot - as noted in
Whinston (2007) - from theory alone argue that one of the approaches is better
than the other one.
2See, for instance, Whinston (2007).
3There is also a debate on whether the price increase is the optimal one, or the price
increase is profitable as such. We follow the approaches in Harris & Simons (1989) and Katz
& Shapiro (2003), and consider the profitability of a price increase. For a discussion of the
optimality criterion, see Bishop & Walker (2002).
4Note that Katz & Shapiro caused a controversy over how much structure to impose when
deriving the market delineation criterion, see the debate in Scheffman & Simons (2003), Harris
(2004), Harkrider (2004) and Katz & Shapiro (2004). The question of structure, though, differs
from the question of whether one should increase one, some or all prices.
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The basic question is whether some products impose a competitive constraint on
the pricing of one or several products, and that should be of importance when
choosing the price test in a particular case. In some case there might be im-
portant competitive constraints the all-price test misses, but the one-price test
captures and vice versa in other cases.5 In most case studies we observe that
a symmetric price increase is imposed on all products in the candidate market.
This seems a good idea in a candidate market with symmetric products - for
example where all products have equal margins and demand structure - because
a hypothetical monopolist is expected to raise prices on all those products sym-
metrically.
If we observe asymmetries, this may no longer be true. Then a hypotheti-
cal monopolist might increase prices more on some products than others. This
could be true, for example, if we have a private label with limited sales and
small margins that competes (or not) with a national brand with large sales
and high margins. Then it might be natural to assume an asymmetric price
increase when one examines the market for the private label and the national
brand. A uniform price increase may lead to large absolute losses for the na-
tional brand compared with the private label. If only the price of the private
label is increased, diversion to the national brand may make the price increase
jointly profitable. If so, the Katz and Shapiro criterion should be preferred.
This shows that which criterion to use - the one with an asymmetric price
increase or the more common one with a symmetric price increase - should be
determined by the characteristics of the candidate market in question.6
3 Harris & Simons (1989) critical loss
The critical loss test of Harris & Simons (1989) is an empirically useful reformu-
lation of the SSNIP test. This test measures the relative reduction in quantity
following a given relative price increase for all the products in the candidate set
that keep their joint profits unchanged. The critical loss defines a profitability
threshold to compare with the actual relative quantity reduction of the candi-
date set of products following the price increase. If the actual loss is smaller
than the critical loss, the price increase is jointly profitable and the market is
delineated. Starting from the profitability criterion
(1) ((1 + x)p− c)q(1− CL)− (p− c)q > 0
where CL is the critical loss, (p, q) are the prevailing price and quantity of the
candidate market in question and x the relative price increase, it is easily seen
that the critical loss is given by
(2) CL =
x
x+m
5There might even be cases where a some-prices test is best suited to identify the relevant
competitive constraints.
6See Daljord, Sørgard and Thomassen (2007) for an empirical application of these princi-
ples.
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The actual loss, represented on the left hand below, is smaller than the critical
loss, represented on the right, iff
(3) x <
x
x+m
where  is the elasticity of demand of the products in the candidate market and
m = p−cp is the price-cost margin. The critical loss test is general in the sense
that it does not rely on strong economic assumptions and applicable in the sense
that it relates just a few variables: margins and demands sensitivity to price
changes. Various versions of the Harris & Simons procedure of increasing all
prices in the candidate market have been applied in competition cases.7
4 The Katz & Shapiro aggregate diversion ratio
Katz & Shapiro (2003) stated their delineating criterion on p. 53:
“If and only if the aggregate diversion ratio is larger than the critical
loss, then the actual loss is less than the critical loss and thus a
hypothetical monopolist would find a SSNIP profitable” (italics in
original)
This statement is incorrect. The result refers to a derivation in footnote 25:
Let there be two products 1 & 2 with equal price-cost margins. Let the
product specific elasticity of product 1 be related to the margin by the inverse
pricing rule as follows:
(4) η =
1
m
.
η is the own-price elasticity of product 1 and m = p−cp is the price-cost margin
of both products. Then, assuming linear demand, the actual loss of product 1
for an x percent price increase is:
(5) AL =
x
m
.
Let the diversion ratio of product 2 and product 1 be given by:
(6) D =
∂q2
∂p1
(
∂q1
∂p1
)−1
The diversion ratio measures the fraction of sales lost on product 1 that is
diverted to product 2 following the price increase. Because the hypothetical
monopolist earns a margin on the sales that is diverted from product 1 to
product 2, it is as if the hypothetical monopolist only lost a fraction 1 − D
of sales on product 1. We may rewrite the actual loss in terms of the relative
decline in sales of the hypothetical monopolist as:
(7) ALHM =
x(1−D)
m
Katz & Shapiro then stated
7see Kokkoris (2005) and O’Brien & Wickelgren (2003) for a critical review of some appli-
cations of the critical loss test.
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“Recall that the critical loss is
CL =
x
x+m
With a few steps of algebra, it can be shown that AL < CL if and
only if D > CL.”
The steps are algebraically correct, but the derivation relies on the false
premise that the critical loss when increasing only one price is xx+m .
8 Katz &
Shapiro apply the critical loss expression of Harris & Simons for the case where
all prices are increased, to their case, where only one price is increased. The
two thresholds are not equal, as we show below.
5 The corrected Katz & Shapiro criterion
We first derive the critical loss and the actual loss of product 1 when increasing
the price of only product 1 in the case of two products in the candidate market.
All results generalize easily to the case of J products.
The actual loss of product 1 following an increase of p1 of x percent is still
given by:
(8) xη11
where η11 is the own-price elasticity of demand of product 1. The critical loss
of product 1 is given by the relative decline in sales of product 1 that keeps the
joint profits of the two products unchanged, i.e. satisfy the equality:
(9) pi1(ps)− pi1(p) + pi2(ps)− pi2(p) = 0
where ps = ((1 + x)p1, p2). Expanding the equation, we get:
((1 + x)p1 + c1)q1(1− CL)− (p1 − c1)q1+
(p2 − c2)q2(1 + xη21)− (p2 − c2)q2 = 0
(10)
where η21 is the cross-price elasticity of product 2 with respect to p1. The
criterion reduces to:
(11) (x+m1)R1(1− CL)−m1R1 + xη21m2R2 = 0
where Rj = pjqj . Solving for CL, we get:
(12) CL =
x
x+m1
(
1 + λD
)
where λ = p2−c2p1−c1 measures the relative profitability of the two products. The
critical loss of product 1 is the Harris & Simons expression for the critical loss
8These are the algebraic steps:
ALHM < CL ⇒ x(1−D)
m
<
x
x+m
⇒ D > CL
In the case of unequal mark-ups, the Katz & Shapiro criterion generalizes to λD > CL, where
λ = p2−c2
p1−c1 .
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when increasing the price of all products in the candidate market plus a term
proportional to λD accounting for the diversion of sales to product 2. Katz &
Shapiro failed to recognize that the critical loss is larger when only one price is
increased than if all prices are increased, because the total quantity reduction
is attenuated by more sales diverted from product 1 to product 2 than if both
prices are increased.
The consequence of the mistake can be seen by setting λ = 1, suppressing
the subscripts and taking the difference between the corrected critical loss and
the Harris & Simons threshold:
(13)
x
x+m
(1 +D)− x
x+m
=
x
x+m
D > 0.
The Katz & Shapiro criterion tends to define broader markets than intended
since it understates the true critical loss.
Combining (8) and (12), the actual loss of product 1 is smaller than the
critical loss of product 1 in the case of increasing only one price if and only if:
(14) xη11 <
x
x+m1
(
1 + λD
)
.
Using (4) it simplifies to:
(15) xη11 < λD
In the symmetric case of Katz & Shapiro, λ = 1 and the criterion is reduced to:
(16) AL < D
where we have suppressed the subscripts for convenience. Inserting (4) once
again in (15), we may compare the corrected criterion to the original:
Correct :
x
m
< DWrong :
x
x+m
> D.(17)
Note that the corrected criterion fortunately is just as simple in terms of infor-
mation requirements as the incorrect one.
The actual loss of product 1 is smaller than the critical loss if and only if
the (aggregate, mark-up weighted) diversion ratio is larger than the actual loss.
That is simply another way of stating that the diversion ratio equals the (cor-
rect) critical loss. The correction implies a restatement of Katz & Shapiro’s
delineating criterion:
If and only if the aggregate diversion ratio is larger than the actual
loss, then the hypothetical monopolist would find a SSNIP profitable.
6 Concluding remarks
In Katz & Shapiro (2003) it is shown that the delineating criterion for a one-price
test becomes quite simple and easy if one is willing to imply some structure.
Unfortunately, there is an error in the derivation. Applying the criterion re-
ported in Katz & Shapiro (2003) tends to delineate too broad markets. The
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reason is that the model fails to take into account that by raising only one price
some sales are diverted to the other products in the candidate market. The di-
version of sales to other products in the candidate market makes a single-price
increase more profitable than an all-price increase. There is then more scope for
a profitable price increase when one applies the correct criterion than when one
applies the erroneous criterion reported in Katz & Shapiro (2003). Fortunately,
the correct criterion is just as simple and easy to apply.
In most case studies we observe that a symmetric price increase is imposed
on all products in the candidate market. The US Merger Guidelines leave it
an open question whether one should increase one, some or all prices in the
candidate market when performing a SSNIP test. The ambiguity should be
embraced. How to increase prices should be determined by the characteristics
of the candidate market in question to more accurately identify the competitive
constraints. When products in the candidate market are asymmetric, imposing
asymmetric SSNIPs may make more economic sense.
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